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judgment of the court of appeals.
Kris A. Zumalt

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding substantive due
process and equal protection rights were not violated when neither a
legitimate government purpose in delaying the issuance of a land use
permit existed, nor an exercise of free speech violation existed, when
the delay was not the result of retaliation).
In May 1991, Plaintiffs, John and Susan Baker ("Bakers"), applied
for a permit to build a pier on land they owned and operated as a tree
farm on Clark's Island in Plymouth Harbor, Massachusetts. The pier
would enable equipment unloading in furtherance of the tree farm
operation. Clark's Island served as a major nesting area, or heronry,
for several varieties of sea birds. The Army Corps of Engineers was in
the process of preparing to issue the permit when Jay Copeland, an
environmental researcher for Natural Heritage, objected.
Natural Heritage felt the proximity of the nesting area to the
Bakers' tree farm would disrupt the heronry, thus causing the birds to
abandon their nests. After the issuance of a notice-and-comment
period, Natural Heritage contacted an ornithologist, Dr. Katharine
Parsons, who was familiar with the island. Parsons informed Copeland
of her concerns about the land use and of her suspicions that the land
was merely a "tax dodge." Parsons also told Copeland of Mr. Baker's
opposition to 1989 legislation that, if enacted, would have classified
Clark's Island as an Area of Critical Environmental Concern
("ACEC"), subjecting it to use restrictions. Copeland and others'
subsequent visit to the island revealed the heronry was essentially
destroyed.
After contact with other agencies and some investigation into the
Bakers' operation, Natural Heritage filed a formal opposition to the
permit application, asserting the pier construction would significantly
contribute to the destruction of a major natural resource. Further,
Natural Heritage successfully collected ten citizens' signatures to
initiate environmental review under the Massachusetts Environmental
Policy Act. After Natural Heritage filed the required forms, the
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs ("EOEA")
issued a decision requiring the Bakers to file an Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR"). After litigation concerning the scope of the EIR, the
Army Corps of Engineers issued the permit to the Bakers in 1997, and
the Bakers built the pier.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

This suit followed. The Bakers alleged, among other things, that
Massachusetts EOEA officials-namely, Trudy Coxe, Thomas French,
Jay Copeland, Patricia Huckery, Bradford Blodget, Jane Mead, Susan
Tierney, and Janet McCabe (collectively "EOEA officials") -violated
the Bakers' substantive due process and equal protection rights
("Count I"), and First Amendment rights for retaliation in the exercise
of free speech ("Count VII") by delaying the permit issuance. The
district court dismissed Count I for failure to state a claim, and granted
summary judgment concerning Count VII in favor of the EOEA
officials.
The First Circuit affirmed both decisions. Regarding Count I, due
to the nature of the governmental conduct, the court found that
substantive due process and equal protection claims regarding local
land use permits were essentially the same inquiry. The court declared
that even an arbitrary denial, absent either a gross abuse of power that
shocked the conscience, invidious discrimination, or legally irrational
action, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court
determined the Bakers' three alleged instances of official misconduct
did not breach this constitutional barrier. In each instance, the EOEA
performed a legitimate government purpose by reviewing the permit
application, and the Bakers suffered no adverse action from the
alleged misconduct.
Regarding Count VII, the court noted that delay of an application
for a land use permit in unjustifiable retaliation for expressions of
political views violated the First Amendment if a plaintiff established
three elements: (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) he was
qualified for the permit; and (3) the delay was in retaliation for the
The First Circuit focused on only the last
disfavored speech.
requirement, as did the district court. The court acknowledged the
speech at issue involved Mr. Baker's opposition to the ACEC
legislation in the Massachusetts legislature, two years before the Bakers
However, only defendants
filed their pier permit application.
Copeland, Huckery, French, and McCabe knew of Mr. Baker's
opposition to the legislation, thereby making the evidence of
retaliatory motive insufficient. Further, the protected speech occurred
More
two years before the review of the Bakers' application.
importantly, even if Mr. Baker had made a prima facie case, Coxe had
a nonretaliatory reason for opposing the permit-the tree farm's
impact on the heronry, not the pier's impact on the heronry. The
court found the district court's reasoning appropriate, and the Bakers'
claims of errors non-meritorious. As such, the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.
Adam B. Kehrli

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding groundwater quality monitoring company was not liable

